The Gambler

You've got to know when to hold 'em, and know when to fold 'em.



Oliver Stone's sequel to Wall Street opened this week, and his new star, Shia LaBeouf, engaged in some gambling of his own. If Stone were a gambler, he would've wagered LaBeouf's potential winnings against the domestic gross of Wall Street 2: Money Never Sleeps, but Stone does not play an important position for a New York sports team. There are three prominent examples of the gambling mindset active in New York sports; it's up to the bettor to understand the trends and separate passion from his wagers in order to score big:



1. There are only two active quarterbacks with more consecutive starts than Eli Manning: his brother Peyton, and Brett Favre. While there have been numerous comparisons between the brothers, the Giants' bedrock is closer in nature to the latter than to the former.



Manning is partly responsible for his New York Giants' Week 3 loss against the Tennessee Titans: under immense pressure within yards of the goal line, Eli attempted to loft the ball to an open receiver with his non-throwing hand, resulting in an interception. The Titans won the game 29-10, and Eli did not record a touchdown; while his teammates deserve the majority of the blame for the loss (due to a lack of discipline), Eli has taken shots for his seemingly moronic play.



The left-handed shovel pass was a move taken straight out of the Brett Favre playbook, and it was a move that Peyton Manning would never attempt. But a play that acts as a microcosm of the NFL season reveals an important truth about a player: Eli is a riverboat gambler, and even the most successful gamblers lose big on occasion.



Peyton Manning is on pace to become the greatest quarterback in NFL history, and Peyton Manning would never throw a left-handed shovel pass to his tight end in the end zone for an interception. But do not focus completely on the failures: instead, focus on the complete balance of horrendous failures and glorious successes. Peyton Manning is the smart gambler, folding when he has bad cards and only striking when dealt a favorable hand. Eli Manning, on the other hand, will go for it, even if he does not feel completely comfortable with his situation. Yet it should be noted that the most spectacular failures by great gambles are often accompanied, in the overall win-loss column, by the truly mind-blowing successes.



If a gambler to choose between Peyton and Eli, the gambler must look at Eli's awful left-handed toss this week and remember this crucial lesson:



The quarterback who refuses to attempt an ill-fated left-handed shuffle pass would also refuse to attempt the greatest play in NFL history.



2. The New York Yankees may not deserve to make the playoffs, at least based on their September swoon, but they at least learned a valuable lesson for the future:



Stop babying pitchers.



The Yankees went through this in 2008 and 2009, when Joba Chamberlain, seemingly destined for great things, became an erratic headcase who inexplicably lost velocity on his fastball. Despite their failure with Chamberlain, the Yankees attempted to implement the same strategy with Phil Hughes in 2010.



They were wrong.



In two July starts in which Hughes' turn was skipped in the rotation, Hughes gave up football-like numbers. In two September starts that Hughes was somewhat forced into, he dominated opposing hitters for 5-6 innings before tiring and succumbing to the whims of biased veteran umpires. Unlike many experienced pitchers (such as teammates CC Sabathia and Andy Pettitte), Hughes rarely received the benefit of the doubt from umpires, forcing him to throw more pitches and exert himself in a more taxing manner.



Despite Hughes' own failings (20+ home runs allowed at home) and the umpires' inherent bias against young pitchers, Hughes proved himself to be a tremendous #3 starter for the Yankees' playoff run . . . provided that the Yankees don't screw him over by throwing him off of his rhythm.



A smart gambler would wait to see what the matchups in a potential Yankee series are, and, i-f the games are scheduled close enough, bet on Hughes to produce a strong outing - certainly stronger than AJ Burnett on almost any occasion, CC Sabathia against a mirror image (John Lester, Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay), or Andy Pettitte against a team that steals signs (which the Phillies have done - just as the 2001 Diamondbacks did in Game 6 of the 2001 WS).



3. Baseball observers eagerly await the day that Mariano Rivera stops being the most clutch pitcher in postseason history. That day will arrive in a few weeks, especially since the Boston Red Sox publicized the book on how to beat the great Rivera in the last week of the season.



Great closers are usually hit or miss, with the hits being tremendous. Goose Gossage only gave up two home runs to George Brett, but both were monumental: the turning point of the 1980 ALCS, and a regular season game in 1983 which defined the Yankees' season and threw them off of their equilibrium ("The Pine Tar Game"). Gossage also famously rejected his manager's advice in the 1984 World Series to walk Kirk Gibson; once his fastball was deposited into the upper reaches of Tiger Stadium, both Gossage and his manager knew that the World Series was lost.



Gossage was not the only Hall of Fame closer victimized by Gibson: perhaps the most famous baseball moment of the last 50 years saw an elite closer get smacked around by Gibson. Dennis Eckersley was considered the greatest relief pitcher of all time by a unanimous vote until Rivera made his name known, but while Eck won a World Series and accumulated tremendous stats, his blown save in Game 1 of the 1988 World Series stands as the premier moment of his career.



Rivera has avoided such mischief despite blowing a playoff series with a home run (Sandy Alomar in Game 4 of the 1997 ALDS) and blowing a World Series (Game 7 in 2001). The Alomar HR was swept away with the knowledge that Rivera was growing into the role of closer (and three straight World Series championships to follow), and the 2001 Series was rationalized through a combination of sheer luck (his errors on sacrifice bunts) and cheating (Luis Gonzalez, who muscled a great Rivera pitch over the head of Derek Jeter to win the Series, is one of the prime suspects of the "Steroid Era").



Rivera's two blown saves in the greatest collapse in baseball history are far more instructive for predicting his future playoff failures. The 2004 ALCS saw Rivera blow 2 saves, although he pitched out of both blown saves to give his team a chance to win the game in extra innings. Both blown saves seem appropriate given his circumstances in 2010 and his opposition in the 2010 postseason.



Game 5 saw Rivera inherit a bases loaded situation with one out in the 9th inning. Joe Torre, weary of using Rivera in multiple innings on consecutive nights, pitched Tom Gordon, and Gordon promptly allowed David Ortiz to make it a game and loaded the bases. Rivera, brought on by a panicked Torre, allowed a shallow sacrifice fly that technically tied the game; the run, and the fault, belonged to Rivera's setup man and his manager. Apparently, Rivera would be considered a failure if he did not strike out three batters in a row.



The Yankees' bullpen this year revolves around Joba Chamberlain, Boone Logan, David Robertson, and Kerry Wood. Logan has become manager Joe Girardi's lefty specialist, but if he gives up a hit, he is done for the night; Robertson, a baseball Houdini, has not inspired enough confidence in Girardi to use him as a primary setup man, even though Robertson was magnificent in last year's playoffs and throughout the season. That leaves Girardi with Joba and Wood, both of whom are susceptible to baserunners. Wood, in particular, has been outstanding, but many of his outs have been hit hard. He is vulnerable to a rally, putting Rivera in an untenable situation.



Game 4 of the '04 ALCS, however, is more relevant. In that game, a batter reached first on a walk. A pinch runner was called for, and the runner immediately stole second. Standing in scoring position, the runner let out a silent cheer as the next batter hit a ball just under Rivera's foot into center field to tie the game.



The most miraculous aspect of this comeback is not the Sox's tying of the game, nor Rivera's escape to propel the game to extra innings. In fact, the true miracle is that the Sox's strategy was not adopted for another six years, a half decade in which an aging Rivera proved himself to be not only the greatest relief pitcher of all time, but the only relief pitcher who deserves serious consideration among the top 25 pitchers in baseball history.



In September 2010, the Red Sox finally figured out how to beat Rivera: if they could just get a runner onto first base, they could steal both second and third. With the infield drawn in, either a sacrifice fly or a hard hit ball past the ill-positioned infield would make Rivera a loser. Despite losing the battle, the Red Sox won the war.



The 2009 Yankees were a juggernaut expected to roll over the competition. The 2010 Yankees, by contrast, may finish first among equals, but with the Texas Rangers and Tampa Bay Rays waiting, the Yankees are vulnerable, especially in the 9th inning. Rivera has always been an illusionist, but he is prone to broken bat bloop hits and stolen bases. Rivera generates his power through his high leg kick: a high leg kick that guarantees a moderately speedy runner scoring position. Rivera experimented with holding runners on in August in Texas; with almost no leg kick, Rivera allowed a 410 foot rocket off the bat of Nelson Cruz and said prayers of thanksgiving that the Texas center field war was 411 feet away.



Rivera can, and will, be beat by teams that steal bases for a living. The steroid era, in which Rivera thrived, saw teams sitting back and waiting for hard hit baseballs, something Rivera gives up as often as America elects its president. The post-steroid era, however, favors the speedy, and closers in general - and Rivera in particular - have seen their effectiveness drop.



This is not Eric Gagne, Joe Nathan, Trevor Hoffman, or Jonathan Papelbon. We are discussing Mariano Rivera, one of the 25 greatest pitchers in baseball history. But we are discussing him in 2010.



Just as we discussed Willie Mays in 1973.



Of course, Mays made the World Series that year, and while he embarrassed himself in the outfield in Oakland, his Mets took a juggernaut As team to the 7th game of the World Series, in Oakland.



At this hour, the Philadelphia Phillies are the likely benefactors of home field advantage for the World Series, and like the early '70s As, they look unstoppable.



Despite the playbook on Rivera being widespread, the 40 year old remains widely respected, much like the over-the-hill Mays was throughout his career.



9th inning, Game 7, Citizens Bank Park, with Rivera facing Chase Utley, Ryan Howard, and Jayson Werth?



I'd gamble on Rivera.